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The Third Tear in Everyday Aesthetics
  Katya Mandoki 
Abstract
Although totally overlooked by mainstream aesthetic theory, various paths were
nevertheless left open for addressing everyday aesthetics, a natural yet
surprisingly controversial topic.  Why they were never taken until recently, when
the theme of everyday aesthetics is now becoming fashionable, can be explained
not only by the obvious fact of philosophical aesthetics’ restrictive focal point on
art but, among other reasons, by a kind of fetishism that demands an object of
recognized value for legitimating an aesthetic inquiry.  This new popularity
entails, however, certain theoretical risks such as clinging to traditional art-
centric and beauty-centric categories to explain the everyday and borrowing
their concepts uncritically.  In this paper I will examine some of these paths and
risks with special emphasis on current events which exude aesthetics throughout
their pores and require attention from this discipline.
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1.   Introduction [1]
Everyday aesthetics, as the array behaviors, values, and preferences related to
human sensibility, has been practiced throughout the historical development of
each and every culture.  Already a million and a half years ago, Homo erectus or
Homo ergaster manufactured Acheulean stone hand axes not for utility alone,
leaving testimony of a feeling for symmetry, dexterity, and grace that still has a
power to captivate us today.  Material cultures in the most diverse social and
natural settings testify to this absolutely intimate relation between the aesthetic
and the everyday in body painting and ritual dances, in funerary and agrarian
ceremonies, in carved and decorated utensils, in embroidered and colorful
clothing, through vernacular clay, stone, and wood dwellings up to the most
sophisticated and complex artworks.  Artists have been constantly aware of this
role of aesthetics in everyday life and expressed it eloquently through all artistic
languages:  incorporating acoustically nature’s sounds and daily songs in music;
verbally depicting everyday situations, feelings and tribulations in literature and
theater, or visually enhancing the grace of animals, the grandeur of space or the
sheer materiality of clothes and domestic items by painters like Vermeer, Van
Eyck, Velazquez, among many others. 
As an important field of interest, however, it is surprising how long it took
aesthetics to seriously and theoretically address the everyday, despite of the fact
that various paths had been open in this direction by important philosophical
schools.  To begin with, Socrates’ deliberation on beauty began taking a chariot
wheel, a vase, and a lady as cases in point when discussing with Hippias.  David
Hume considered problems of taste in quite general, not exclusively artistic,
terms.  The dramatic character of some landscapes was behind Kant’s idea of the
sublime.  His pre-critical reflections on beauty and the sublime where dedicated
not only to art but to an everyday if stereotyped and sometimes hilarious view of
various ethnic groups.   Already at the beginning of the twentieth century Max
Dessoir and Emil Utitz marked a distinction between Ästhetik as a theory of
beauty and Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft a General Science of Art.[2]  This
division was not particularly helpful for an everyday aesthetic, but it certainly
cooperated in making a distinction between aesthetics and art theory.  It was
John Dewey who, more directly, acknowledged the rhythms, energies, doings
and undergoings of everyday life as the basis for more elaborate artistic
experience.[3]  His view, from a pragmatist perspective, was very complex, also
involving biological considerations.
Recent attention to everyday aesthetics mainly consists in selecting certain
everyday items and categories for their contemplative suitability according to
their conformity to the standards of beauty in traditional, mostly Western
aesthetics.  The novelty now consists in including for aesthetic discourse and
official museum exhibits non-artistic items, such as chic design and fashion
objects, mass-produced collectibles, settings and landscapes, vintage articles,
and traditional exotic or popular vernacular crafts.  Others include personal
experiences in walking through a lane, musing, or enjoying a particular task. 
Everyday aesthetics, seen from this perspective, points at the pleasure potential
these multiple objects and actions can offer, particularly to those best acquainted
with the trends in the art world, and assesses their beauty and value
accordingly.  If aesthetics is now defined as a road for well being and a question
of pleasure, why not consider it part of the discipline of hedonics, as Kahneman,
Diener and Schwarz have named it?[4]
If aesthetics is to be confined to this single category of beauty, I often wondered,
why not honor language, such an efficient tool for bridging minds, and give it its
proper name?  I suggest  ‘Beautology’ or more elegantly, ‘Omorphiology’ or
‘Kallology.’  In fact, nothing in the term ‘aesthetic’ itself implies the concept of
beauty nor any particular value or act of judgment.  This association of the
aesthetic with beauty and the judgment of taste appears to have developed from
a disloyal reading of Kant, who clearly distinguished two kinds of judgments:  the
teleological, which is an objective judgment, and the aesthetic, which is
subjective.  Kant dedicated a great part of his third Critique to discuss beauty,
the arts, and the sublime.  Even if it appears to be an oxymoron, he was looking
for a standard to objective subjective judgments.  He never defined aesthetics as
a theory of beauty or of judgment but the other way round:  he defined certain
judgments as aesthetic because they are subjective. 
“The judgment of taste is, therefore, not a judgment of knowledge; thus, it is not
logical, but aesthetic, if we understand by this that the determining base of which
cannot be but subjective.  If in a judgment […the representations …] are only
referred to the subject (his feeling), this judgment is always aesthetic.”[5]
Moreover, aesthetics was never only about artworks, things, possessions,
objects, artifacts, neither etymologically nor in its theoretical foundation.  Even
art does not consist solely  of objects, as Berleant clearly emphasizes this
“unquestioned and inviolable dogma.”[6]  It originally was about aisthesis: 
scientia cognitionis sensitivae.  In his unfinished yet foundational Latin work
Aesthetica (1750), Baumgarten clearly separated the first part, Aesthetica
Theoretica, from the Aesthetica Practica, and partially developed only the former
that was to consist of Heuristica, Methodologia, and Semiotica.[7]  Its subject
matter was not art or beauty but the faculty of sensibility as “inferior knowledge”
derived from our corporeal senses.  To some extent this mistaken synonymy of
aesthetics and art may have developed from his best known work on poetry,
 Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus which, by the
way, is more interesting from a semiotic than an aesthetic perspective.[8]  It is
regrettable that even a field which initially emerged around the inquiry of
aisthesis dealing with processes involved in experiencing, sensing, perceiving (all
occurring by definition only in subjects), has been seized by this widespread
object-centrism. 
2.   The Best of All Possible Artworlds
Some scholars hold on fast and hard to their Panglossianism by assuming that
aesthetics deals only with the best of all possible experiences in this best of all
possible artworlds.  They insist on the exclusive authority conveyed upon a select
few for judging what should or should not be appreciated, approved, or censured
for lack or for possession of a specific kind of value: the so-called “aesthetic
value” (a concept still missing an operative and clear definition).  As I mentioned,
such a view presupposes the aesthetic as an honorific title conferred upon
objects for their gratification potential.  As the discipline opens up a little to
encompass discussion on non-artistic topics, we are now allowed to judge, enjoy,
and confer such aesthetic title to these other artifacts as long as we leave the
beauto-centric and object-centric foundation intact.  At some point, we will have
no other choice but to hire our own private aesthetician to instruct us on the
appropriateness or impropriety of appreciating not only artworks but now also
everyday objects.  We all want to be aesthetically correct, don’t we?
As part of this aesthetic Panglossianism one can say that there seems to be a
consensus around a kind of “categorical agreement with being” in Milan
Kundera’s words.  This means that “the aesthetic ideal of the categorical
agreement with being is a world in which faeces are denied and everyone acts as
if they do not exist.  This aesthetic ideal is called kitsch.”  Kundera asserts that
“kitsch is the absolute negation of faeces; in a literal and figurative sense, kitsch
eliminates from its point of view everything that in human existence is essentially
unacceptable.” [9]
The new trend in everyday aesthetics appears to be going in a direction in which
certain objects are selected by their potential for supplying contemplative,
pleasing results.  If they do, according to the art institution’s criteria, they pass
the discipline’s test and are conferred the title of “aesthetic” in a peculiar
combination of the hedonistic and judgmental view of this field.  This practice of
indexing, cataloging, and presenting certain objects as candidates for
appreciation to a select group of experts and appraisers defines the artworld, as
Danto and Dickie have extensively argued.[10]
It is reasonable that art, as an opportunity for a hard-to-please audience’s
recreation and as a juicy business for investors and speculators in the art
market, demands experts for calculating the value of their assets, as well as
estimating the artistic patrimony of museums and similar institutions.  Marketing
and design would also be significantly interested in aestheticians’ contributions to
a better understanding of likes and dislikes held by diverse sectors of a given
society in order to secure investments and devise efficient baits for
consumption.  Yet aesthetics need not be confined to evaluating objects.
3.  A Categorical Agreement with Being
Aesthetics as a discipline has been committed to such a “categorical agreement
with being” for 250 years by confining itself to highlight beauty (apart from a
very few exceptions) despite the fact that artistic production has explored and
expressed a much wider variety of categories, not precisely beauty:  the
monstrous, the ridiculous, the absurd, the bizarre, the uncanny, the pathetic, the
glorious, the cute, the cool, the glossy.  There is nothing wrong with enjoying the
delights of beauty, but we must acknowledge that, in structuring experience, the
aesthetic may be triggered also, and often much more intensively, by the
bleakness in supermarkets, the sordid quality of cheap hotels and grimy bars, the
revolting aspect of city slums, the starkness of public schools and hospitals, a
sort of creepiness in parking lots, the oppressive storing and piling up of human
beings in massive orthogonal multifamily modular compounds and other equally
hostile environments so widespread in contemporary urban life.
There is no need to spoil the party for those who maintain aesthetics exclusively
as the theory of beauty and of proper and correct judgments of taste.  But to
restrict aesthetics to this self-gratifying task may perhaps be comparable to
reducing medical practice to plastic surgery. 
Trying to understand how was it possible that a civilized, educated society that
enabled such minds and sensibilities as Bach’s, Kant’s, Goethe’s, Beethoven’s
and those of numerous outstanding artists and scholars and yet was capable of
inconceivable atrocities (a question raised by George Steiner in Bluebeard’s
Castle) took me to first come to terms with the key role non-artistic aesthetics
acquired during the nazification of Germany.[11]  Although Nazi art, specifically
its leader’s, excelled in kitsch, I am referring to the aesthetic display through the
whole paraphernalia designed by Speer, Goebbels, Riefenstahl and their Führer
which includes NASDAP ceremonies, swastikas, goose-step marches and stiff
salutes, uniforms, enormous banners, songs, films, slogans, massive assemblies,
flags, monumental architecture, theatricalizations, school rituals, weapon display,
military and State-organized pageants and the like.[12]  This reality necessarily
forces us to recognize the crucial social role of both the aesthetics of violence (in
war propaganda, videogames and in cinema) and the violence of aesthetics (in
numbing sensibilities).  Does it mean that aesthetics can heal? Definitely; but it
can also harm.
Apart from its intimate relation with propaganda, aesthetics is also closely linked
to the expression of social status.  When in 1984 I was working on an
assignment for a monumental artwork installation at a museum, I was planning
to convey how social class differences all end up and are expressed by aesthetic
differences.  As Veblen sharply argued in his Theory of the Leisure Class, status
is manifested by ostentatious consumption, which generally devolves into
ostentatious aesthetics, as if the craving for status would necessarily be
expressed by aesthetic excess.[13]  More luxurious mansions, vintage and sports
cars, stylish clothes, lavish gardens, opulent antiques and art collections, and
sumptuous banquets are perpetual temptations for status cravers, displayers,
and climbers.  Even when I finally decided stripping the resulting piece to the
basics and presenting a monstrously disproportional artwork reflecting the
gruesome imbalance of income, (Histogram 1985, based on the census on
distribution of income) my interest in the topic remained.  By 1991, my Ph.D. 
dissertation Aesthetics and Power (Estética y Poder) dealt with this subject from
a Foucaultian perspective of power resulting from strategies among which the
aesthetic is most salient.[14]  Today, after six published books on everyday
aesthetics, from Prosaica (1994, an introduction to everyday aesthetics) to the
more recent Everyday Aesthetics (2007) and tens of papers on the subject, I can
not deny this has been, quite obsessively, my main topic of research and
teaching for more than twenty years.[15]  What, then, can I offer as a
conclusion from this long path?
First of all, we must face the problem of dealing with such a complex and
unframed subject matter.  The main reaction one gets at the mere proposal of a
non-artistic aesthetics is its disqualification for panestheticism, implying that if
everything is aesthetic, the topic becomes trivial (many of my papers during the
nineties were rejected  by publishers for this reason).  This problem was foreseen
and addressed by Mukarovský, who recognized that any object and any action
can become a vehicle for the aesthetic function but warned that "this does not
imply a panaesthetic affirmation, since: 1) it does not affirm the necessity, but
solely the general possibility of the aesthetic function; 2) it does not question the
dominant position of the aesthetic function among the remaining functions of
given phenomena; 3) one is not to conflate the aesthetic function with other
functions, nor to conceive other functions as mere variants of the aesthetic
function."[16]  I would add that nothing is aesthetic; in fact no thing can be so,
since aesthesis is the condition of subjectivity.
In this sense I would like to acknowledge a ground-breaking yet unpretentious
book on everyday aesthetics.  Written a quarter of a century ago it fully engages
in the very risky, slippery field of an experience-based approach to the aesthetic,
yet manages to come out unharmed.  I am referring to Joseph Kupfer’s
Experience as Art, Aesthetics in Everyday Life.[17]  I regret not having come
across it before and giving it its proper place on my reflection upon the state of
the art in my books.  Kupfer insightfully goes to the core of what everyday
aesthetics is about by stressing its educational, political, moral, and social
implications from a firm pragmatist approach.  He presents an eloquent case and
dedicates a whole chapter to aesthetics’ relation to violence in two instances: as
assertive violence and as ultraviolence, opening up a new and badly needed field
for aesthetic inquiry upon negative aesthetics, a path left open by Theodor
Adorno.[18]
4.   Category Mistakes
Among other results from my investigation, I was able to detect very frequent
category mistakes in aesthetic studies that have hindered paying attention to
everyday sensibility:
1.   The most common is the oxymoron in the notion of “aesthetic objects,” when
no object, by definition, can be aesthetic, namely sensitive, capable of
sensibility.  When people in general speak of “aesthetic objects” what they really
mean is “pretty objects” or the equivalent.  The term is used as an approving,
flattering remark and not in a descriptive, much less theoretical sense.
2.   The second is the tautology of “aesthetic sensibility” which is a redundancy
since these two terms are in fact synonyms:  aesthetics denotes and involves
sensibility by definition.  Other terms such as “sensibility to penicillin” are derived
from this original sense of sentience and sensitivity.
3.   The conflation of “the aesthetic” and “the artistic.”  Subjects are, by
definition, aesthetic since subjectivity equals sensibility.  Objects are not
aesthetic but they can be or not be artistic, depending on social categorization.
4.   Conflating dimensions and institutions.  Institutions (familial, governmental,
religious, educational, sport, arts and entertainment, juridical, medical, etc.)
constitute the cultural and professional topography by which a given social group
organizes its creeds, activities, and division of work, status and labor.  By
contrast, dimensions (semiotic, technological, aesthetic, economic, political) cross
through all these institutions and are dynamic, practical, material and
constructive forces that shape and determine the matrices.[19]  Basically, the
artistic is an institution whereas the aesthetic is a dimension that traverses
through the artistic as well as through other institutions and is in charge of
providing perceptible elements to enhance and distinguish the various
institutional identities.
For Kant, aisthesis broadly involves the interplay of imagination and
understanding, and for pragmatists such as Dewey, there are rhythms and forms
of sensibility, responsiveness, reciprocity, doings and undergoings, receptivity,
awareness and attentiveness, sense and feeling, in short:  vibrant, pulsating
subjectivity.  Aesthetics can focus on artistic experience or ‘poetics‘ (Aristotle’s
term) or upon the non-artistic or everyday, for which I have selected the term
‘prosaics.’  In his Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism,[20] Charles Sanders Peirce
defined Logic as a normative science in regard to representations of truth, Ethics
in regard to efforts of will, and Esthetics in objects considered simply in their
presentation.[21]  Along this line, one can say that everyday life is a matter of
presence, as prosaics is a matter of presentation, and poetics a matter of re-
presentation.[22] 
5.   A Model for the Analysis of Everyday Aesthetics
In order to observe these structures of experience (artistic or not), I proposed in
my book, Everyday Aesthetics:  Prosaics, the Play of Culture and Social
Identities,[23] a methodological device similar to the green and red lenses one
wears to discern otherwise imperceptible visual effects, as in the 1954
stereoscopic film The Creature from the Black Lagoon or the recent Avatar,
except that in this case we must wear 8 lenses instead of two.   I am referring to
an octadic model based on semiotics  for aesthetic inquiry, consisting of the four
registers of perception/communication and four modalities of dramaturgical
display.  These four registers are our normal means or channels of expression
and communication with others in everyday life, consisting of the lexic or words,
acoustic or sounds, somatic or body language, and the scopic or visual and
spatial manifestations.  Naturally, we display the same registers of prosaics in
poetics or art:  lexic in literature and poetry, acoustic in music, somatic in dance
and theater, and scopic in painting and sculpture.  Since we usually communicate
in hybrid registers simultaneously involving words, sound, body and the visual,
this distinction is purely analytical.  Each register enables structuring experience
and impacting on recipients’ sensibility in different ways.  By “modalities” I
denote various forms of attitudinal displays, such as distancing or proxemics,
dynamics or kinetics, accent or emphatics, and open and closed fluidity or
fluxion.  Sixteen combinations are thus possible (which could become 32 if we
consider two degrees of intensity: positive and negative).[24]
 LEXICS ACOUSTICS SOMATICS SCOPICS
PROXEMICS LexicProxemics
Acoustic
Proxemics
Somatic
Proxemics
Scopic
Proxemics
Short Long S L S L S L S L
KINETICS Lexic Kinetics AcousticKinetics
Somatic
Kinetics Scopic Kinetics
Dynamic Static D S D S D S D S
EMPHATICS LexicEmphatics
Acoustic
Emphatics
Somatic
Emphatics
Scopic
Emphatics
Marked Unmarked M U M U M U M U
FLUXION Lexic Fluxion AcousticFluxion
Somatic
Fluxion Scopic Fluxion
Open Closed O C O C O C O C
6.  Aesthetic Displays in Social Institutions
As I have argued extensively in my books, we can explore the processes of
aisthesis in various social contexts, specifically through all cultural institutions
characterized by the manner or form in which they structure our experience. 
Thus we have specific and regulated aesthetic forms and practices through all
institutions in a given society.  Let us examine a few:
Family.  The primeval context that configures our experience in a particular way
is the family.  A family is framed within the walls or fences of each home which
constitutes its setting or staging.  Decoration, props, clothing, gadgets, habitual
intonation in verbal exchanges, the tone of voice and verbosity in communication
among members, the particular types of music or its absence at home, the body
proximity or distance among family members and types of interaction all affect
the form and quality of experience within that family.  How seasons and
festivities are marked within the family cycles, as with Christmas trees, Passover
celebrations, weekends, birthdays, meals, morning and evening rhythms, division
of tasks, the place given to each person at the table, the clutter, frugality, the
ambience at home, all configure the family members’ everyday sensibility. 
Religion.   The most impressive non-artistic aesthetic displays have been
performed within religious institutions.  Religious aesthetics is related not only to
paintings, sculptures, architecture, and music on religious topics usually
considered “religious art.”  More importantly, it reflects the way our experience is
configured to generate the belief in each religion’s world view and to arouse
devotion towards certain ideas, persons, objects, and places.  The religious
universe is thus experienced when attending temples and performing
celebrations which engage and give form to our experience of the sacred.  The
grace and order of the choreography, the music, the intricate setting and
carefully detailed clothing, the words rhythmically and solemnly pronounced, the
scent of incense, paraffin and flowers appealing to the body, the elegance in the
ritual, all endow our experience with a sense of harmony and the idea of
holiness, or with fear and trembling.  Religious aesthetics has been the main
source for organized aesthetic nourishment in many people’s lives for
millennia.[25]
Advertisement.  By aesthetic strategies, marketing and commercial ads fabricate
pleasant, intriguing or smart connotations for products attaching friendly,
desirable or successful “identities” to the brands and commodities they promote. 
Witty commercials are able to trigger precise associations, as in Apple Macintosh
computer’s initial ad inspired by Orwell’s 1984, designed to appeal to young,
intelligent, and well informed potential consumers, who would associate the
experience created by the ad (thrill, surprise, dexterity, and wit) with the
commodity marketed.[26]  These ads may not be artworks but they undeniably
display aesthetic strategies to structure the imaginary experience of possessing a
certain object.
Sports.  The aesthetics of sports is salient.  Each Olympic opening ceremony is
aesthetically designed for moving the global audience.  In particular, sport
aesthetics are irrefutable in the perfect grace and dexterity of so many athletes,
like Nadia Comaneci’s all tens 1976 Montreal performance and Yelena
Isinbayeva’s 2008 Beijing pole-vault jump puts this topic in the right
perspective.  Yet many fellow aestheticians, among them Welsch, still require an
artistic justification to argue for the aesthetic character of sports.[27]  Kupfer
describes the rich experiential process involved in sports in his body-electric
chapter.  As he observes, there are qualitative or “formal” sports whose
excellence is equivalent to beauty of movement.[28]
Military.   The military institution strongly depends not only on the practical
effectiveness of martial tactics but on implementing an aesthetic impact for
various goals: intimidation, drafting, cohesion, discipline, legitimation, and so
on.  The astonishing imagination invested in the aesthetic production of weapons
exhibited in museums, from masks and armor to decorated swords and shields
for the military, expresses the vehemence dedicated to the aesthetics of war.
State.  As with the military, government institutions also recruit and display
great talent for aesthetic production, particularly during presidential campaigns,
where aesthetics can be crucial in impacting potential voters’ sensibilities and
changing the tide of events.  We can testify the bandwagon effect in full force
during electoral periods, frequently triggered by aesthetic devices.  TV campaign
commercials attempt to target citizens aesthetically or emotionally rather than
rationally, as the famous Hillary Clinton’s ad, “It’s 3 A.M.”  During the 2008 USA
presidential elections, both parties included Mexican mariachi music to appeal to
Latino voters, yet none was explicit on the illegal migrant population problems
and suggested solutions. 
7.  Exuding Aesthetics
The masterpiece of electoral aesthetics is the Yes We Can video, seen at least
about 24 million times in YouTube and Dipdive.  The lyrics were taken from
Barack Obama’s New Hampshire presidential primary speech, and the music and
assemblage was performed by Will.i.am.   Jesse Dylan made the black and white
video.[29]  It seems it was all voluntary, enthusiastic work, not commissioned by
the candidate.
Applying the Octadic model very briefly to this video, we can clearly appreciate in
the lexic register, the eloquence, rhythm and suggestive images evoked by the
speech, with an effective religious flavor conveyed by the “yes we can” chorus
(as the “I like Ike” Eisenhower slogan).
It was a creed written into the founding documents that declared the destiny of a
nation.  Yes we can.
It was whispered by slaves and abolitionists as they blazed a trail towards
freedom.   Yes we can.
It was sung by immigrants as they struck out from distant shores and pioneers
who pushed westward against an unforgiving wilderness.  Yes we can.
It was the call of workers who organized; women who reached for the ballots; a
President who chose the moon as our new frontier; and a King who took us to
the mountaintop and pointed the way to the Promised Land.
Yes we can to justice and equality. Yes we can.[...W]e are one people; we are
one nation; and together, we will begin the next great chapter in the American
story with three words that will ring from coast to coast; from sea to shining
sea--
Yes We Can.
By lexic kinetics and emphatics, Obama’s speech is both the rhythmic
background for people’s words and, vice versa, people’s words are the
background for Obama’s in euphony and polyphonic harmony, efficiently creating
the sense that the candidate represents their ideas and dreams and is one with
them.  The acoustic proxemics and emphatics of Obama’s voice in both tone and
warm timbre produce a sense of proximity, and the candidate and performers’
open and relaxed fluxion is convincing.  The “Yes we can” slogan almost becomes
an “amen” choir and a percussion drum accompaniment.  Somatically all
performers appear receptive, content, and even joyful, with a relaxed attitude in
both body language and facial expression.  They unify, in the same rhythm and
sound, a feeling that invites empathy, keeping consistency between both the
acoustic and the somatic registers.  On the scopic or visual, the video was
prepared in black and white, which helps convey a sense of sincerity and
frugality, but also creates a special atmosphere verging almost on the
reverential.  Visually attractive young celebrities of different ethnic backgrounds
wear casual, simple, everyday clothes, shortening proxemics which helps
identification by the audience.  It is not presented as a spectacular show-off but
almost as a random frame in the natural stream of events in everyday life.  The
“Yes we can” slogan associated to Luther King’s “I have a dream” and a
background crescendo of “We want change” voices, enhanced by patriotic
resonances from the America the Beautiful stanza “from sea to shining sea”
surges to a climactic effect, and blends the “hope” and “vote” words in red.
8.  Conclusion
To conclude, we crave aesthetically promising configurations for the pleasure or
thrill we can derive from them.  This craving explains how and why a baptism
ceremony, a vacation trip or a football game, a birthday party or a community
ritual, a political meeting with a charismatic leader or a school graduation
contribute to captivate our feelings or capture our imagination in ways that we
recognize, not always consciously, but that nonetheless guide our decisions and
determine the kind of life we lead. 
Being sensitive creatures, aesthetics is always involved in various spheres of our
natural, cultural, and social activities, and it is important to be aware of it.   Its
efficacy for moving people’s emotions is constantly squeezed out by politics’ and
marketing’s aesthetic engineering.  Millions of people are enjoying the deliberate
production of an aesthetics of violence through the film and videogame industry,
and other millions are undergoing violence against their sensibility in numbing
routines, gender oppression, and inhospitable life conditions.  The number of
teens consuming addictive drugs keeps growing, pointing to a deterioration in the
condition of their sensibility by the stimuli they are deprived of but urgently
need.  Yet some aestheticians seem to prefer the trivial task of going around the
world authorizing or de-authorizing what should or should not be aesthetically
appreciated, to the less pleasurable one of trying to cope, even if at least
conceptually, with these other more complex and socially crucial issues. 
Milan Kundera once wrote:  “Kitsch causes two tears to flow in quick succession. 
The first tear says:  How nice to see children running on the grass! The second
tear says:  How nice to be moved, together with all mankind, by children running
on the grass.  It is the second tear that makes kitsch kitsch.”[30] Aestheticians
have discovered a third tear that trickles down our professional cheeks in feeling
How nice to be moved, together with all aestheticians, by the correct things to
appreciate!  I am convinced we can do much better than this aesthetic
correctness.
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